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Abstract 
In this paper, we present a model of ‘collective innovation’ built upon the network 
formation formalism. In our model, agents localized on a circle benefit from 
knowledge flows from other agents with whom they are directly or indirectly 
connected. They support costs for direct connections which are linearly increasing 
with geographic distance. The dynamic process of network formation e xhibits 
preferential meeting for close agents (in the relational network and in the 
geographic metrics). We show how the set of stochastically stable networks 
selected in the long run is affected by the degree of knowledge transferability. We 
find critical values of this parameter for which stable "small world" networks are 
dynamically selected. 
Keywords: Network Formation, Stochastic Stability, Preferential Meeting, Self-
Organization, ‘Collective Innovation’, Small Worlds 
 
 
 
Les réseaux d’innovation auto-organisés : les conditions d’émergence 
des « Petits Mondes ». 
 
Résumé 
Dans ce papier, on présente un modèle ‘d’innovation collective’ construit à partir 
du formalisme économique de formation des réseaux. Dans notre modèle, des 
agents, localisés sur un anneau, bénéficient des flux de connaissances d’autres 
agents avec qui ils sont directement ou indirectement connectés. Ils supportent des 
coûts de maintien de leurs connexions directes qui croissent linéairement avec la 
distance géographique qui les sépare. Le processus dynamique de formation de 
réseau repose sur une règle de rencontre préférentielle pour des agents proches 
(dans le réseau relationnel et sur la métrique externe). On montre comment 
l’ensemble des réseaux stochastiquement stables varie selon le d egré de 
transférabilité des connaissances. On trouve des valeurs critiques de ce paramètre 
pour lesquelles des réseaux de type "small worlds" sont sélectionnés par le 
processus dynamique.  
Mots-clé: Formation des Réseaux, Stabilité Stochastique, Rencontre Préférentielle, 
Auto-organisation, ‘Innovation Collective’, Petits Mondes. 
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 I. Introduction
A growing body of empirical literature is concerned with the inﬂuence of
network relations on ﬁrms rates of innovation. Far from being the outcome of
isolated agents eﬀorts, innovation is usually described as a collective and inter-
active process (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; von Hippel, 1989). Allen (1983) put
in evidence those characteristics focusing on what he called the ‘collective inven-
tion’ phenomenon. According to him, it occurs when social interactions generate
knowledge disclosure between agents belonging to competing ﬁrms which in turn
stimulates incremental innovation. Powell et al. (1996) also emphasize the role
of networks as a source of innovation, improving and facilitating information and
knowledge transfers: “a network serves as a locus of innovation because it pro-
vides timely access to knowledge and resources that are otherwise unavailable”
(Powell et al., 1996).
Another body of empirical analyses highlights that the “local milieu” plays
an important role in favoring knowledge diﬀusion (Antonelli, 1999). Many em-
pirical studies show that innovation activities are spatially clustered and beneﬁt
from localized knowledge spillovers (Feldman, 1994; Audretsch, 1998). Saxenian
(1994) shows that in the Silicon Valley, it is a dense social network stimulated by
an open local labor market which promotes collective learning among competing
ﬁrms through collaborations or informal communication. Nevertheless, making
use of a network approach, she provides qualitative evidence showing that, de-
spite similar origins and technologies, Silicon Valley and Route 128 followed
very distinct evolution trajectories. The example of Route 128 demonstrates
that geographic clustering is not a suﬃcient condition to ensure the emergence
of regional networks. Thus, geographic proximity can only be considered as an
imperfect proxy to capture the existence of network relations which generate
knowledge spillovers (Balconi et al., 2002). On the other way on, geographic
space should be considered as non neutral for the process of network formation:
thus the “milieu” and the network (when it exists) are likely to overlap.
This paper aims to study ‘collective innovation’ in a model of network for-
mation, where myopic self-interested agents beneﬁtf r o mk n o w l e d g eﬂows from
agents with whom they interact either directly or indirectly. We make the
assumption that the higher the distance i nt h er e l a t i o n a ln e t w o r kt h ew e a k e r
the spillover. In other words, we consider that a decay is aﬀecting knowledge
diﬀusion. The agents support costs for direct connections which are linearly
increasing with geographic distance separating them. The main concern is the
dynamic formation of networks. Indeed, if several previous theoretical works
focus on how network structures matter for innovation dynamics through infor-
mation, knowledge or technology diﬀusion (for example, David and Foray, 1994;
Valente, 1996; Cowan and Jonard, 2001; Young, 2002), they are not concerned
with network formation which remains a crucial issue for knowledge dynamics
3and innovation1. This question is of interest: if the network structure has obvi-
ously much to say about innovative performance, then one may naturally wonder
about the circumstances that allow various network structures to emerge. Thus,
a “self-organization” perspective2 is chosen to study the emergence of networks
and its co-evolution with knowledge diﬀusion. In particular, we focus on how
network selection is aﬀected by the easiness of knowledge ﬂows (i.e. by the
decay).
Directly related to this work are the recent formal economic contributions
highlighting how (both individual and collective) behaviors and performances
a r eg r o u n d e di nn e t w o r k s ,w h i c ha r eo f t e ni nt u r ns h a p e db ya g e n t s 3.T h ev e r y
originality of this approach is the focus on network formation. A theoretical
framework has been proposed by Jackson and Wolinski (1996) based on a two-
sided network formation game4. Concepts of (myopic and pairwise) stability
and of eﬃciency have been introduced in this framework. This contribution also
constitutes an important point of departure to analyze and model endogenously
emerging structures.
Jackson and Watts (2002) (initiated in Watts, 2001) have developped the
dynamics of that approach by introducing the notion of stochastically stable
networks based on notions and results initially proposed by Young (1993) and
Kandori et al. (1993). To study the dynamic formation of networks, we make
use of their stochastic Markov process. More precisely, they introduced random
errors which invert agents’ right decisions in creating, maintaining or deleting
links. While following their contribution, our model departs from theirs in that
we enrich the meeting process. We introduce a preferential meeting process
which governs the dynamic process of links formation, assuming that agents
meet easily other agents in their neighborhood. This way we simply reject the
uniform meeting probability and weight the probability that two unconnected
agents meet with both the inverse of their distance (on both metrics: the rela-
tional and the geographic ones). We expect that the underlying Markov chain
will select pairwise equilibria that have some in common with the empirical
literature on networks.
1Cowan and Jonard (2001) study the impact of network architectures on knowledge dif-
fusion and show that knowledge grows at diﬀerent rates depending on them. This model
has been extended in Cowan et al. (2002) who model agents matching with each other to
combine their knowledge to innovate. Nevertheless, the networks formation is only captured
by cumulative frequency matrices which constitute the “trace” of ponctual interactions.
2See for example Lesourne and Orléan (1998) and Paulré (1997) for some insights on the
concept of “self-organization”.
3Predictions concern various contexts such as information diﬀusion on job opportunities
(Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2001; Calvó-Armengol, 2003), ﬁrms’ design (Radner, 1993;
Bolton and Dewatripont, 1996, Guimerà et al., 2001), R&D collaborations (Goyal and Joshi,
2000; Goyal and Moraga, 2001), market organization (Weisbuch et al., 2000), etc.
4Their approach is also usually called “mixed approach” since it is half way between the
cooperative (Slikker and van den Nouweland, 2000) and the non-cooperative ones (Bala and
Goyal, 2000). More precisely, it assumes that two agents have to agree simultaneously to
become directly connected while only one defection breaks an existing link.
4This way we come to another body of literature which emerged recently in
Physics dealing with the structure of large networks as evidenced by web sites
links, relational networks, coauthoring scientiﬁc paper (Barabási and Albert,
1999, 2000; Watts and Strogatz 1998; Newman et al., 2001)5. The general
conclusions of this literature are that such networks are highly clustered and
exhibit some long distant connections67. Such structures are usually called
small worlds because despite a very large number of nodes (agents) the average
distance between them is usually small (known as the “six degree of separation”,
Milgram, 1963).
Doing this, we ﬁnally face another issue, namely the characterization of
equilibrium networks for which the economic literature on network formation
has not dedicated much attention, focusing mainly on the compatibility between
networks eﬃciency and stability (Jackson, 2003). The typical network structures
discussed in this framework are the cycle, the empty network, the star, and the
complete network. Here, the selected equilibria we obtain cannot fall anymore
systematically under these usual categories. Therefore, we make use of several
indexes that capture interesting features of the graphs. We show that diﬀerent
values of the knowledge transferability parameter generate qualitatively diﬀerent
network architectures. In particular we ﬁnd that for critical values of the decay
in knowledge spillover parameter the stochastic process selects pairwise stable
small worlds networks in the long run.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the static features of our
‘collective innovation’ model in the network formation formalism and introduces
indexes used to characterize networks. Section 3 is devoted to the dynamics,
highlighting the preferential meeting rule we propose and the generic properties
of the stochastic process. The results obtained are presented in Section 4. The
last section concludes.
5As a matter of fact, our preferential meeting rule has some in common with the so called
“preferential attachment” process which has recently been highlighted as crucial for generating
networks characterized by skew vertices distribution. Several models have been introduced:
Barabási et al. (2001), Yook et al. (2001), Jeong et al. (2003), Bianconi and Barabási
(2001), Newman (2001) and, for a complete review, Albert and Barabási (2002). However
these models have a poor description of agents behaviors.
6Those non local, distant connections can be viewed as “weak ties” as described by Gra-
novetter (1973).
7These two features characterize small worlds àl aWatts and Strogatz (1998). Another
general result of that literature is that the nodes degree distribution is usually quite skew.
This last result comes from the s c a l ef r e en e t w o r k sapproach (Barabási and Albert, 1999,
2000). In this paper, we do not concentrate on that issue which should be extensively studied
in a forthcoming dedicated work.
5II. The ‘collective innovation’ model in the net-
work formation formalism
The point of departure of our model is the network formation formalism
introduced by Jackson and Wolinski (1996). Consider a ﬁnite set of n agents,
N = {1,2,...,n} with n ≥ 3, and let i and j be two members of this set. Each
agent is assumed to increase its knowledge through internal capacities and/or by
communicating directly through costly relationships with other agents. Direct
connections between agents, which are called pairwise links since the willingness
of both the two agents is necessary to establish and maintain a link, form the
relational network which is represented as a non-directed graph. In this model,
agents can also beneﬁt from indirect (and costless) connections, through the
relational network of their partners, but in a decreasing manner i.e. the beneﬁts
deteriorate with the relational distance. We then consider that the rate at which
agents innovate is deduced from their knowledge accumulation rate which is in
turn obtained through their relations network.
We begin with some basic notions in network formation. We then turn to the
description of the innovation process through knowledge diﬀusion and accumula-
tion resulting from internal capacities and from direct and indirect connections
that allow the absorption of knowledge. Finally, we introduce several graph
indexes which can be used to characterize various networks architectures.
A. Basic notions in network formation
1. Properties and typical structures of graphs
Agents are represented by the nodes of a non-directed graph which edges
represent the links between them. The graph then constitutes the relational
network between the agents. A link between two distinct agents i and j ∈ N is
denoted ij. A graph g is a list of non ordered pairs of connected and distinct
agents. Formally, {ij} ∈ g means that ij exists in g.W e d e ﬁne the complete
graph gN := {ij | i,j ∈ N} as the set of all subsets of N of size 2,w h e r ea l l
players are connected with all the others. Let g ⊆ gN be an arbitrary collection
of links on N.W ed e ﬁne G =
©
g ⊆ gNª
as the ﬁnite set of all possible graphs
between the n agents.
Let g0 = g + ij = g ∪ {ij} and g00 = g − ij = g\{ij} be respectively the
graph obtained by adding ij and the one obtained by deleting ij to the existing
graph g. The graphs g and g0 are said to be adjacent as well as the graphs g
and g00. For any g,w ed e ﬁne N(g)={i | ∃j : ij ∈ g}, the set of agents who have
at least a link in the network g and let #N(g) be the number of the players in
g.W e a l s o d e ﬁne Ni(g) and ηi(g), the set and the number of the links agent
i has, that is: Ni(g)={ij | ∃j : ij ∈ g} and ηi(g)=# Ni(g).T h e l a t t e r i s
6also called the degree of node i. The total number of links in the graph g is:
η(g)=# g = 1
2
P
i∈N ηi(g)
A path in a non empty graph g ∈ G connecting i to j, is a sequence of
edges between distinct agents such that {i1i2,i 2i3,...,ik−1ik} ⊂ g where i1 = i,
ik = j. The length of a path is the number of edges it contains. Let i ←→ j
be the set of the path connecting i and j.T h e shortest path between i and j
(possibly a set of paths having the same minimal length) noted ig ←→j is such
that #ig ←→j =m i n i1i2,i2i3,...,ik−1ik∈g #{i1i2,i 2i3,...,ik−1ik},i 1 = i,ik = j.W e
deﬁne dg(ij)=d(i,j)=# ig ←→j as the number of links of the shortest path
between i and j, also called geodesic distance. When there is no path between
i and j then their geodesic distance is conventionally inﬁnite: d(i,j)=∞.
An external metric can be introduced, representing for example, the ge-
ographic position of agents. Such external metrics deﬁnes a distance oper-
ator denoted d0(i,j). Johnson and Gilles (2000) consider that agents have
a ﬁxed location and are spaced equally on a line in the following manner:
i’s location is at the point i. Thus, they can deﬁne the geographic distance
(vs. proximity) between i and j as equal to |i − j| without loss of general-
ity. In our model, we consider that agents are located on a circle (or a ring).
Agents are ordered in the same manner except that agent 1 is in the neighbor-
hood of agent #N(g).T h u s w e c a nd e ﬁne the geographic distance as follows:
d0(i,j)=m i n{|i − j|;n − |i − j|}.
Finally, a graph g ⊆ gN is said to be connected if there exists a path between
any two vertices of g. The subgraph g0 ⊂ g is a connected component of g,i f :
- for all i ∈ N(g0) and j ∈ N(g0) with i 6= j,t h e r ee x i s t sap a t hi ng0
connecting i and j and,
-i fi ∈ N(g0) and j/ ∈ N(g0),w i t hi 6= j, there doesn’t exist a path in g0
connecting i and j.
The set of all components of g is denoted by C(g) such that: g = U
g0∈C(g)
g0
(a component cannot consist in an isolated agent who has no links)8.
Hence several typical graphs can be described. Let i,j ∈ N. First of all, the
empty graph,d e n o t e dg∅, is such that it does not contain any links. A ring is
a connected graph composed of exactly one path. Formally, we call a network
g ∈ G ar i n g( a l s oac h a i n )i fg is connected and if :
- for all i<j: ij ∈ g, there does not exist h such that i<h<jand
- for all i>j: ij ∈ g, there does not exist h such that j<h<i .
Such a graph is denoted g◦. It is a regular network of order k =1 ,i nw h i c h
all agents are connected and only connected with their two closest geographic
neighbors. The double ring denoted g2◦ is a regular network of order k =2
such that all agents are connected and only connected with their four closest
8Notice that a cycle on g is a path for which {i1i2,...,ik−1ik} ⊂ g is such that i1 = ik. A
graph is said to be acyclic if it contains no cycle.
7neighbors. Finally, a non empty graph g ∈ G is a (complete) star, denoted g ,
if there exists i ∈ N such that if jk ∈ g ,t h e ne i t h e rj = i or k = i.A g e n ti is
called the center of the star. Notice that there are n possible stars, since every
node can be the center.
2 Network formation, stability and eﬃciency
Over time, pairs of agents meet and decide to form, maintain or break links.
The formation of a link requires the consent of both the two agents but not its
deletion which can emanate from one of them unilaterally. Moreover, agents
are myopic which means that they take decisions on the basis of their impacts
only on their current payoﬀs i.e. according to the state of the current network.
Let πi (gt) be the individual payoﬀs that agent i receives from the graph gt.
Jackson and Wolinski (1996) introduce the notion of pairwise stability which can
be distinguished from the one of Nash equilibrium since the process of network
formation is both cooperative and non cooperative. The formal deﬁnition of
this notion is the following.
Deﬁnition 1. (Jackson and Wolinski, 1996) A network g ⊆ gN is pairwise
stable if:
(i) for all ij ∈ g, πi(g) ≥ πi(g − ij) and πj(g) ≥ πj(g − ij),a n d
(ii) for all ij / ∈ g,i f πi(g + ij) >π i(g) then πj(g + ij) <π j(g).
The eﬃciency of a network is computed by the total value of the correspond-
ing graph g, which is a function π :
©
g | g ⊆ gNª
→ R,w i t hπ(∅)=0 .A t a
given period t,i ti sg i v e nb y :
π (gt)=
P
i∈N
πi (gt) (1)
Deﬁnition 2. (Jackson and Wolinski, 1996) A network g ⊆ gN is eﬃ-
cient if it maximizes the value function π(g) on the set of all possible graphs ©
g | g ⊆ gNª
i.e. π(g) ≥ π(g0) for all g0 ⊆ gN.
B. Knowledge ﬂows and innovation
1. Knowledge accumulation and (memoryless) innovation
Let us assume that the arrival of innovation follows a Poisson process, thus
exhibiting an exponential arrival which rate is a linear function of knowledge
accumulation. Such modeling is quite similar to the patent race one presented in
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) or in Reinganum (1989) apart from the fact that we
are not interested in the ‘race’ dimension: the innovations are not substitute but
complement. Let kt
i denote agent i’s stock of knowledge at period t.T h ei n s t a n -
taneous probability that i innovates when reaching any given level k of its stock
of knowledge is given by the exponential density function: P (ki = k)=λe−λk.
8The probability that agent i innovates reaching the knowledge level k (ki = k)
knowing that he has not innovated already (since the last innovation) is given by
the following conditional probability: qi = P {ki ∈ [k,k + dk] | ki >k }, which
may be computed using the well known memoryless property of the exponential
distribution (having a constant hazard rate), as follows:
qi =
P {ki ∈ [k,k + dk],k i >k }
P (ki >k )
=
f(k)
(1 − F(k))
= λ
Thus, the probability that agent i innovates during any unitary period t:
P (ti ∈ [t,t +1 [ )is given by:
pt
i =
Z t+1
t
qikτ
i dτ (2)
Having deﬁned ∆kt
i =
R t+1
t kτ
i dτ the knowledge variation over period t, one
clearly gets:
pt
i = λ∆kt
i (3)
2. Network and knowledge diﬀusion
Let us now turn toward describing how the knowledge is diﬀused through
the network connections. Let us assume that knowledge is accumulated both
through internal (ﬁxed) capacities of the agent and through the direct and
indirect connections that allow him to absorb others’ (new) knowledge. Thus
the total knowledge accumulated at period t may be obtained as follows:
∆kt
i = ∆ki (gt)=ωi +
X
j∈N\i
δ
d(i,j)ωj (4)
where gt is the state of the current network (which is invariant on [t,t +1 [ ), ωi
and ωj are respectively the knowledge created by agents i,j ∈ N during one
unitary period of time and which are assumed to be exogenous and constant
over time and agents. Thus the second component of the expression (4) is
traducing the ﬂow of knowledge absorbed by i, which emanates simultaneously
from other agents j (assuming no time lag for simplicity), through direct and
indirect interconnections between i and agents j.T h u s ,p a r a m e t e rδ represents
the transferability factor that is the share of new knowledge produced which
is eﬀectively directly or indirectly transmitted through each edge. Hence, we
assume that δ ∈ ]0,1[. For instance, if i and j are indirectly connected through
a third agent, each will get δ
2 of the ﬂow of knowledge each creates.
Let us now deﬁne the (expected) payoﬀ function which is deduced from the
shape of the graph:
πt
i = pt
iV − ct
i (5)
where pt
i is the innovation probability seen above (3), V is the net proﬁt
generated by an innovation and ct
i is the costs incurred by i, computed as follows:
ct
i = ci (gt)=C +
X
j:ij∈gt
cd0 (i,j) (6)
9It is thus potentially aﬀected by a ﬁxed cost and the costs spent for being
connected to his direct neighbors9.
The net proﬁt generated by any agent i at period t, may be thus understood
as a function of the graph and the position i occupies in it. That value may
thus be written as πt
i = πi (gt)=π (∆ki (gt),c i (gt)). Compiling expressions (5)
(4) and (6) one gets:
πi (gt)=λV

ωi +
X
j∈N\i
δ
d(i,j)ωj

 − C −
X
j:ij∈gt
cd0 (i,j) (7)
Remark 1. Our formulation of the payoﬀ function is voluntarily very close
to the so-called “connections model” ﬁrst introduced in Jackson and Wolinski
(1996). If we arbitrarily ﬁx λ =1 /V, C =0 , and d0 (i,j)=1 ,∀i,j, thus we have
the same formulation as theirs. Notice that if we have ωi = ωj = λV = C =1 ,
then one gets the simple connections model which is well known in the network
formation literature. One can also observe that when reintroducing geographic
distance in link cost, then one obtains the same payoﬀss p e c i ﬁcation as the one
of Johnson and Gilles (2000), who ﬁrst introduced some external metric (theirs
is the line instead as the circle in our model).
C. Networks characterization: some indexes
Finally, we introduce several indexes which may all together contribute to
improve the standard characterization of networks.
1. Expected eﬃciency
The social surplus generated by a network is generally computed by simply
adding individual payoﬀs. Thus the average social surplus is given by:
π(g)=
1
#N
X
i∈N
πi(g) (8)
We may be also interested in the overall allocation of payoﬀs, thus following
Cowan and Jonard (2001) we may compute the variance in individual payoﬀs
as follows:
var(π)=
1
#N
X
i∈N
[πi(g) − π(g)]
2 (9)
2. Direct connections and neighborhoods
9Relying on Debreu (1969) hypothesis according to which closely located players incur less
cost to establish communication, Johnson and Gilles (2000) have ﬁrst extended the connections
model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introducing a spatial cost topology in their network
formation approach. Links costs are increasing with geographic distance between agents. The
traditional assumption is that it’s less costly to establish and maintain relationships when
agents are geographicly close.
10Computing the average number of neighbors gives us a measure of the net-
work density:
η(g)=
1
#N
X
i∈N
ηi(g) (10)
The range of the network is a measure introduced by Goyal and Joshi (2002),
which is giving the gap between the biggest neighborhood and the smallest one:
R(g)=m a x
i∈N
ηi(g) − min
j∈N
ηj(g) (11)
Goyal and Joshi (2002) also proposed an index labeled unequal connections
which measures the average asymmetry between neighborhood size of directly
connected people. This index is given by:
u(g)=
2
P
i∈N ηi(g)
X
ij∈g
¯ ¯ηi(g) − ηj(g)
¯ ¯ (12)
3. Generic graph properties
Let us introduce the well known indexes of average path length and average
cliquishness introduced by Watts and Strogatz (1998) which are widely used in
the physics of networks literature.
The ﬁrst one is simply computing the average distance of (directly or indi-
rectly) connected agents. It is given by:
d(g) ≡
1
#N (#N − 1)
X
i∈N
X
j∈N\i:
∃i←→j⊂g
d(i,j) (13)
The average cliquishness indicates to what extent the neighborhoods of con-
nected people overlap ("the friends of my friends are my friends"). It is:
c(g)=
1
#N (#N − 1)
X
i∈N
X
jl:j,l∈Ni(g)
∆(l,j)
ηi(g)
(14)
with ∆(l,j) deﬁnes such that ∆(l,j) ≡
½
1 if j ∈ Nl(g)
0 otherwise
Finally a very interesting measure of the network structure is the full de-
scription of the degree distribution (edge distribution over the nodes population):
{nk,k=0 ,1,...,n− 1}
with nk =
P
i∈N Θ(ηi(g),k);and Θ(ηi(g),k) ≡
½
1 if ηi(g)=k
0 otherwise
4. Geographic correlation
11Lastly, we examine to what extent the geographic distances and the relational
connections overlap. Let us thus propose a geographic correlation index which
gives the geographic distance separating each direct connections in the network:
D(g)=
X
j:ij∈g
d0(i,j)
η(g)
(15)
III. Dynamic network formation
This section is dedicated to the presentation of our perturbed stochastic
process of network formation. We begin with the ﬁrst step of the dynamic
settings, namely the meeting process. We will consider that the probability for
a given pair of unconnected agents to be selected is not ﬁxed but varies across
agents according to their relative position on the current relational graph. Then,
we turn towards the last features of the dynamic process and present its generic
properties.
A. The preferential meeting process
In most of the works investigating the evolution of network (for example
in Watts, 2001; and Jackson and Watts, 2002), it is assumed that any pair of
agents have the same probability to meet at each period: it thus constitutes
an implicit assumption of an uniform meeting probability: ∀i,j ∈ N,pij = p.
This assumption is twofold: i) every pair of unconnected agents have the same
probability to meet; or ii) connected agents reconsider their relations at the
same frequency as unconnected ones do.
Here we reject the former part of the assumption while trying to preserve
the latter for symmetry reasons. Thus if we write P (Q) the probability that a
pair of agents chosen is unconnected (connected), we then assume that:
P =
X
ij/ ∈g
pij =1− Q =
#gN − η(g)
#gN (16)
Together, with considering that ∀ij ∈ g,pij = p, this implies that the prob-
ability that two connected agents meet at each period is such that p = 1
#gN .
Moreover, we do not consider that unconnected people may meet with con-
stant and time independent probabilities. Indeed, this assumption can be jus-
tiﬁed in the case of anonymous market interactions when the number of agents
12considered is very large. Here, we introduce a preferential meeting process10,
considering that the probabilities for a pair of unconnected agents to be selected
is not independent across agents and vary according to their relative position on
the current relational graph. Hence, we consider that the less is the relational
distance between two unconnected agents, the greater will be the probability of
their selection. Moreover, we consider that this probability increases with their
geographic proximity, which is invariant. This ensures that the probability of
any two unconnected agents is never null (which is a necessary condition to
preserve the ergodicity property of the stochastic process presented below)11.
Formally, we introduce a preferential meeting process for unconnected agents
which is captured by the simple following formula:
pt
ij =
γ
d(i,j)
+
β
d0 (i,j)
,∀ij / ∈ gt (17)
having introduced time superscripts, and where γ and β are two positive
parameters capturing the relative importance of relational indirect connections
and geographic proximity in the probability that two unconnected agents meet
each other. That expression is also subject to standard normalization, i.e. it is
normalized such that:
P
ij/ ∈gt pt
ij =
#gN−η(gt)
#gN .
B. The limit behavior of the perturbed stochastic process
The dynamic process can be described as follows. At each time period t,t w o
agents i and j ∈ N are selected by the preferential meeting process described
above. Then, if the selected two agents are directly connected, they can jointly
decide to maintain their relation or unilaterally decide to sever the link between
them. If they are not connected, they can jointly decide to form a link or
renounce unilaterally. Formally, those two situations are the following:
(i) if ij ∈ gt, the link is maintained if πi(gt) ≥ πi(gt − ij) and πj(gt) ≥
πj(gt − ij). Otherwise, the link is deleted.
10The notion of “preferential attachment” has been introduced in the model of Albert and
Barabási (1999) who rediscovered a process ﬁrst suggested by Simon (1955). Albert and
Barabási show that in real networks, the likelihood of being connecting to a node depends
on the number of direct links of this node: “linking is never random. Instead, popularity is
attractive. [...] Network evolution is governed by the subtle yet unforgiving law of preferential
attachment” (Barabási, 2002). However, the preferential attachment process they describe is
diﬀerent of our preferential meeting process since they consider that the networks evolution
is built on the addition of new nodes which prefer to be linked to the nodes that have more
links. In other words, highly connected nodes increase their connectivity faster than their less
connected peers. For quantitative support on the presence of preferential attachment, one
can refer to Jeong and al. (2003) who provide some measurements on four networks (science
citation network, WWW, actor collaboration and science co-authorship network).
11In a similar way (and for a similar reason), Vega-Redondo (2002) considers two possible
“routes of search” in the links formation process. The ﬁrst is local that is mediated by the
social network while the second is said to be “global” since the meeting occurs between agents
in two diﬀerent components of the network with a small probability.
13(ii) if ij / ∈ gt, a new link is created if πi(gt + ij) ≥ πi(gt) and πj(gt + ij) ≥
πj(gt),with a strict inequality for one of them.
The stochastic process introduced here can be deﬁned as a Markov chain
which ﬁnite states correspond to the “current” network at the end of a given
period. In other words, the state of the system at time t (with t =0 ,1,2,...)
is given by the graph structure gt ∈ G. The evolution of the system {gt,t≥ 0}
can be described as a discrete-time stochastic process with state space G.
Following Jackson and Watts (2002), we then introduce small random per-
turbations ε (ε ∈ (0,a]) which invert agents’ right decisions in creating, main-
taining or deleting links. These perturbations may be understood as mistakes
or as mutations. The characterization of the asymptotic behavior of this process
is due to Young (1993). For small but non null values of ε (ε ∈ (0,a]), it can
be shown that the discrete-time Markov chain being irreductible and aperiodic,
has a unique corresponding stationary distribution. Such perturbed stochastic
processes are said to be ergodic. Intuitively ergodicity implies that it is possible
to transit directly or indirectly between any chosen pair of states in a poten-
tially very long period of time (which also means that any state of the system
can be directly or indirectly reached from any given one)12. Moreover, when ε
goes to zero, the stationary distribution converges to a unique limiting station-
ary distribution. The states that are in the support of this limiting stationary
distribution are called stochastically stable and a r ee i t h e rp a i r w i s es t a b l e( c f .
Deﬁnition 1) either part of a close cycle of states13. Notice that the ergodicity
property is quite interesting since it allows us to run numerical simulations in
order to examine the long run behavior of the system (Vega-Redondo, 2002):
we can then compute the unique limiting stationary distribution of the process.
IV. Networks selection in the simple collective
innovation model: the results
In this section, we present the results obtained for a simpliﬁed version of the
collective innovation model presented in Section 2. As it is explained in Remark
1, our general model (7) may be simpliﬁed to obtain the following speciﬁcation
of the proﬁt function which from now on becomes our basic proﬁte q u a t i o n :
πi (gt)=
X
j∈N\i
δ
d(i,j) − c
X
j:ij∈gt
d0 (i,j) (18)
12It allows the long run state of the system to become independent of its initial conditions.
Indeed, processes that are non-ergodic are said to be “path dependent” (David, 1985) since
their limiting behavior is dependent on the initial state of the system.
13Such process is called a regular perturbation of the initial stochastic process (without
trembles). Deﬁnitions, properties and some proofs are examined in Carayol and Roux (2003).
Initial contributions are the ones of Freidlin and Wentzell (1984), Young (1993), Kandori et
al. (1993), and Jackson and Watts (2002).
14Let recall that in this model, agents ares located on a circle. Moreover, for
simpliﬁcation purposes, we will consider that c = 2
n for even values of n,a n d
c = 2
n−1, otherwise14. Recall also that the dynamic process used is based on
the preferential meeting principle introduced in Section 3. For simpliﬁcation
purposes again, we use a simple rule assuming that γ = β =1 . Meeting rule
before normalization (17) then becomes:
pt
ij =
1
d(i,j)
+
1
d0 (i,j)
,∀ij / ∈ gt (19)
We next propose to numerically simulate the unique limiting stationary dis-
tribution of the perturbed dynamic process of Jackson and Watts (2002) (for
which the error term is decreasing up to zero) by the following simple rule:
εt =
½
0,02 if t<50
1/t otherwise (20)
Thus we ensure that errors aﬀect the dynamics while it is decreasing down to
zero when time increases: limt→∞ εt =0 .
In the following subsection we study the limit distribution of states and show
that small world-like networks may be selected through the process of network
formation. Secondly, we propose a more systematic analysis of how network
architecture varies with the decay parameter δ, that is how network selection is
aﬀected by the easiness of knowledge ﬂows on networks.
A. Limit networks selection: the emergence of small worlds
The ﬁrst goal is to study the limit distribution of the process in one simple
numerical situation. For that purpose, we ran 1.000 simulations of 10.000 peri-
ods15 with the empty graph as initial condition and with γ = β =1 ,δ=0 ,7 and
c =0 ,1. Nodes degree distribution is presented in Figure 1. One can observe
that the distribution peaks at 6 neighbors, being slightly asymmetric. It is to be
noticed that no agent has less that four neighbors: this is because establishing
direct links with geographically close agents is weakly costly. In the meantime,
there is no agent having more than eight neighbors because no-one is intending
to support the high costs of many direct links. The network self-organizes itself
in a shape which has some in common with regular networks. One may observe
in the descriptive statistics obtained on such distribution (presented in Table
1 in the Appendix) that the cliquishness coeﬃcient c(g) is quite high: nearly
as high as the one of the double ring g2◦. More, these clustered networks are
correlated to the geographic metric: the average geographic distance between
14This simpliﬁcation is close to the one introduced by Johnson and Gilles (2000) in the
“line” world case.
15Time series analyses conduced over more than 100.000 periods showed that the process has
nearly allways converged on a given pairwise stable state after 10.000 periods. For evidence
and details see again the companion paper Carayol and Roux (2003).
15connected pairs of agents is quite small (D(g) ' 2,5). However, the network
departs from such regular structure in that the average path length is singularly
lower than for the single ring (1,84 <d (g◦) ' 5,26).
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Figure 1. The nodes degree distribution (mean-max-min) in the simple
collective innovation model (with 1000 experiments, 20 agents, 10.000 periods).
In order to provide a better understanding of these results, we represent
in Figure 2 below two networks structures selected in the long run. The ﬁrst
structure is obtained with our model whereas the second is obtained with the
Simple Connections model of Jackson and Wolinski (1996), that is both without
preferential meeting and without link costs increasing with geographic distance.
It should be noticed that both networks are pairwise stable for their respective
payoﬀs function. The left graph clearly exhibits small world features: high
clusterization while some distant connections remain. How such stable small
world has been selected from the empty network is presented in the appendix
(Figures 6, 7 and Table 2).
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Figure 2. Two typical selected networks after 10.000 periods respectively with
(left graph) and without (right graph) preferential meeting and geo link costs.
B. How the limit distribution varies with delta?
In this subsection, we look at how the limit distribution varies with decay
parameter δ.W eﬁnd that the average eﬃciency increases with δ.Average neigh-
borhoods size exhibits an inverse U-shape. The average path length decreases
16from δ =0 ,1, then remains constant and increases for high values of δ. Aver-
age cliquishness suddenly reaches his maximum for δ =0 ,2 and decreases from
then down to 0 when δ is close to 1. Geographic correlation index increases until
δ =0 ,5 and decreases from δ =0 ,8. Finally, we surprisingly observe that the
more δ the more the instability of the graph: activity (creation plus deletion)
increases with δ up to 0,85. The intuition for this result is that the less δ, the
less substitutable are direct (close vs. distant) links. These results are exposed
in the Figure 3.
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Figure 3. The graph indexes in the simple collective innovation model when
δ ∈ ]0;1[ varies (1000 experiments, 20 agents, 10.000 periods).
The diﬀerent networks conﬁgurations that emerge in the long run are more
easily observed by degree distribution presented in the Figure 4. Therein, we
can (indirectly) observe that the empty graph g∅ is selected when δ ≤ c =0 ,1.
When c<δ≤ 2c the geographic ring g◦ emerges: in this case, all agents
are connected to their two closest neighbors. When δ is 0,3, nearly all agents
17are connected to four agents who are likely to be their four closest geographic
neighbors. This situation corresponds to the double geographic ring g2◦.F r o m
0,4 <δ≤ 0,7, we observe a very ‘stable’ situation (plateau) characterized
by ﬂat maximum neighborhood sizes which decrease from there. At the very
beginning of that conﬁguration (δ ' 0,4), we already have the weakest average
path length while average cliquishness is still close to its maximum (cf. Figure
3). Such a situation presents many similarities with the small world network
structure. While the ‘plateau’ conﬁguration is exposed in the ﬁrst graph of
Figure 2, the other typical ones may be found in Figure 5.
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Figure 4. The limit degree distribution in the simple collective innovation
model when δ ∈ ]0;1[ varies (1000 experiments, 20 agents, 10.000 periods).
181
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Figure 5. Limit typical stable networks selected by the stochastic process in
the simple collective innovation model (with 20 agents, 10.000 periods). The
ﬁrst network (simple ring g◦) has been obtained for δ =0 .1; the second
network (double ring g2◦) has been obtained for δ =0 .3; the third network
(small world) has been obtained for δ =0 .4; the last network has been obtained
for a high value of delta δ =0 .98.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we examined a dynamic stochastic process of network forma-
tion following the contribution of Jackson and Watts (2001) who introduced a
dynamic stochastic process in the initial model of network formation proposed
by Jackson and Wolinski (1996). In our network based model of ‘collective in-
novation’, agents beneﬁtf r o mk n o w l e d g eﬂows by communicating with agents
with whom they are directly or indirectly connected. To examine the selected
innovation networks, we studied the characteristics of the long term selected
graphs, without limiting our attention to some typical structures (the empty
graph, the star or the complete network). We made use of several statisti-
cal indexes to capture interesting features of the graphs (average path length,
clustering coeﬃcient, node degree distribution, etc.). We studied the stabil-
ity against noise (error probability) of the graphs selected and also computed
their eﬃciency. We also introduced heterogenous cost of linking and a pref-
erential meeting rule governing the dynamic process of links formation, which
consisted in weighting the meeting probability between any two agents by the
inverse of their relational and geographic distance. The results concerned the
set of stochastically stable networks selected. For diﬀerent numerical values of
19the knowledge transferability parameter (decay parameter δ), we described the
diﬀerent network architectures that are emerging in the long run.
These results may contribute to shed a new light on the issue of networks
formation which proves to be crucial for the distributed innovation phenom-
enon. We showed that when the transferability of knowledge is low, networks
tend to be locally clustered. Increasing slightly the transferability of knowl-
edge increases the density of local networks. Increasing again slightly that value
stimulates the emergence of distant connections. This last result consists in com-
puting the critical values of the decay in knowledge spillover for which pairwise
stable small worlds networks are dynamically selected.
References
Albert R. and Barabási A.L., 2002, “Statistical mechanics of complex net-
works”, Reviews of Modern Physics, 74, p. 47-97.
Allen R.C., 1983, “Collective invention”, Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 4, p. 1-24.
Antonelli C., 1999, The Microdynamics of Technological Change, Routledge,
London.
Audretsch D.B., 1998, “Agglomeration and the location of innovative activ-
ity”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 14(2), p. 18-29.
Bala, V. and Goyal, S., 2000, “A non-cooperative model of network forma-
tion”, Econometrica, 68, p. 1181-1229.
Balconi M., Breschi S. and Lissoni F., 2002, “Networks of inventors and
the location of university research: an exploration of Italian data”, CESPRI,
Working Paper n. 127.
Barabási A.L., 2002, Linked. The New Science of Networks,P e r s e u sP u b -
lishing, Cambridge.
Barabási A.L. and Albert R., 1999, “Emergence of scaling in random net-
works”, Science, 286, p. 509-512.
Barabási A.L. and Albert R., 2000, “Topology of evolving networks: Local
events and universality”, Physical Review Letters, 85, p. 5234-5237.
Barabási A.L., Jeong H., Néda Z., Ravasz E., Schubert A. and Viscek T.,
2001, “Evolution of the social network of scientiﬁc collaborations”, Physica A,
311, p. 590-614.
Bianconi G. and Barabási A.L., 2001, “Competition and Multiscaling in
evolving net-works”, Europhysics Letters, 54, p. 436-442.
Bolton P. and Dewatripont M., 1994, “The ﬁrm as a communication net-
work”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99(4), p. 809-839.
Calvó-Armengol A., 2003, “Job contact networks”, Mimeo, University of
Barcelona and CERAS-ENPC.
Calvó-Armengol A. and Jackson M.O., 2001, “Social networks and the result-
ing dynamics and patterns of employment and wages”, mimeo, Caltech. Revised
20in October 2002 with the title “ Social networks in determining employment and
wages: patterns, dynamics and inequality”.
Carayol N. and Roux P., 2003, “ ‘Collective innovation’ in a model of network
formation with preferential meeting”, Presented at WEHIA Conference, 29-31
May 2003, Kiel, Germany.
Cowan R. and Jonard N., 2001, “Knowledge creation, knowledge diﬀusion
and network structure”, in A. Kirman and J.B. Zimmermann (eds.), Economies
with Heterogenous Interacting Agents, Springer.
Cowan R., Jonard N. and Zimmermann J.B., 2002, “The joint dynamics
of networks and knowledge”, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical
Systems, 521, p. 155-174.
Dasgupta P. and Stiglitz J., 1980, “Industrial structure and the nature of
innovative activity”, T h eE c o n o m i cJ o u r n a l , 90, p. 266-293.
David P.A., 1985, “Clio and the economics of Qwerty”, American Economic
Review, Papers and Proceedings, 75, p. 332-337.
David P.A., Foray D., 1994, “Percolation structures, Markov random ﬁelds
and the economics of EDI standard diﬀusion”, in Pogorel (ed), Global Telecom-
munication Strategies and Technological Changes, North-Holland, Amsterdam,
p. 135-170.
Debreu G., 1969, “Neighboring economic agents”, La Décision, 171, p. 85—
90.
Feldman M.P., 1994, The Geography of Innovation,K l u w e r .
Freidlin M. and Wentzell A., 1984, Random perturbations of dynamical sys-
tems, Springer Verlag, New York.
Goyal S. and Joshi S., 2002, “Unequal connections”, mimeo, University of
London and University Georges Washington.
Goyal S. and Joshi S., 2000, “Networks of collaboration in oligopoly”, Dis-
cussion Paper TI 2000-092/1, Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam-Rotterdam.
Goyal S. and Moraga J.L., 2001, “R&D networks”, mimeo, Tinbergen Insti-
tute Rotterdam.
Granovetter M., 1973, “The strength of weak ties”, American Journal of
Sociology, 78, p. 1360-1380.
Guimerà R., Arenas A., Díaz-Guilera A. and Vega-Redondo F., 2001, “In-
formation processing and optimal organizational structures”, Working paper.
Jackson M.O., 2003, “A survey of models of network formation : stability
and eﬃciency”, mimeo, California Institute of technology, Pasadena.
Jackson, M.O. and Watts, A., 2002, “The evolution of social and economic
networks”, Journal of Economic Theory, 106(2), p. 265-295.
Jackson M.O. and Wolinsky A., 1996, “A strategic model of social and eco-
nomic networks”, Journal of Economic Theory, 71, p. 44-74.
Jeong H., Néda Z., and Barabási A.L., 2003, “Measuring preferential attach-
ment in evolving networks”, Europhysics Letters,61(4), p.567-572.
Johnson C. and Gilles R.P., 2000, “Spatial social networks”, Review of Eco-
nomic Design, 5, p. 273-299.
Kandori M., Mailath G. and Rob R., 1993, “Learning, mutation and long
run equilibria in games”, Econometrica, 61, p. 29-56.
21Kline S. and Rosenberg N., 1986, “An overview of innovation”, in Landau R.
and Rosenberg N. (eds), The Positive Sum Strategy, National Academy Press,
p. 275-305.
Kulkarni V.G., 1995, Modeling and analysis of stochastic systems, Chapman
and Hall, London.
Lesourne J. and Orléan A. (eds.), Advances in Self-Organization and Evolu-
tionary Economics, Economica, Paris, p. 240-261.
Milgram, S., 1967, “The small world problem”, Psychology Today, 2, p. 60-
67.
Newman M.E.J., 2001, “Clustering and preferential attachment in growing
networks”, cond-mat/0104209.
Newman M.E.J., Watts D.J. and Strogatz S.H., 2001, “Random graphs mod-
els of social networks”, preprint, to appear in Proceedings of the National Acad-
emy of Science.
Paulré B., 1997, “Evolutionnisme contemporain et auto-organisation”, Economie
Appliquée, 3, p. 121-150.
Powell W.W., Koput K.W. and Smith-Doerr L., 1996, “Interorganizational
collaboration and the locus of innovation: networks and learning in biotechnol-
ogy”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 41, p. 116-145.
Radner R., 1993, “The organization of decentralized information process-
ing”, Econometrica, 61(5), p. 109-1146.
Reinganum J.F., 1989, “The timing of innovation: research, development
and diﬀusion”, in R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig (eds), Handbook of Industrial
Organization, Elsevier Science Publishers, Vol.1, Chapter 14, p. 849-908.
Saxenian A., 1994, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon
Valley and Route 128, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Simon H.A., 1955, “On a class of skew distribution functions”, Biometrika,
42(3-4), p. 425-440.
Slikker and van den Nouweland A., 2000, “Network formation models with
costs for establishing links”, Review of Economic Design, 5, p. 333-362.
Valente T., 1996, “Social network thresholds in the diﬀusion of innovations”,
Social Networks, 18, p. 69-89.
Vega-Redondo F., 2002, “Building up social capital in a changing world”,
mimeo, University of Alicante, September.
Von Hippel E., 1989, “Cooperation between rivals: informal knowhow trad-
ing”, in B. Carlsson (ed.), Industrial Dynamics, Technological, organizational
and Structural Changes in Industries and Firms, Kluwer, Boston, p. 157-176.
Watts, A., 2001, “A dynamic model of network formation”, Games and
Economic Behavior, 34, p. 331-341.
Watts D.J. and Strogatz S.H., 1998, “Collective dynamics of ‘small worlds’
networks”, Nature, 393, p. 440-442.
Weisbuch G., Kirman A. and Herreiner D., 2000, “Market organization”,
Economica, 110, p. 411-436.
Yook S., Jeong H.,Barabási A.L., and Tu Y., 2001, “Weighted evolving net-
works”, Physical Review Letters, 86(25), p. 5835-5838.
22Young H.P., 2002, “The diﬀusion of innovations in social networks”, Working
Paper, SantaFe.
Young H.P., 1993, “The evolution of conventions”, Econometrica, 61(1), p.
57-84.
Appendix
mean median max min var
Av eﬃciency: π 8,70 8,70 8,87 8,57 0,00
Var eﬃciency: var(π) 27353 27344 85943 28412 26560
Av nbr neighbors: η(g) 5,67 5,70 6,20 5,3 0,03
Min nbr neighbors: minηj(g) 4,04 4,00 5 4 0,04
Max nbr neighbors: maxηi(g) 7,06 7 8 6 0,17
Range neighbors: R(g) 3,02 3 4 1 0,22
Unequal connections: u(g) 1,84 1,82 3,21 0,55 0,21
Av path length: d(g) 1,84 1,84 1,94 1,69 0,00
Av cliquishness: c(g) 0,042 0,042 0,053 0,03 0,00
Geo correlation: D(g) 2,47 2,46 2,77 2,26 0,01
Activity 116,15 115 171,78 78 218,1
Table 1. Some descriptive statistics on the graph indexes computed for the
limit graph distribution in the collective innovation model.
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Figure 6. An example of stable network formation in the collective innovation
model.
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Figure 7. The degree distribution of the network presented in Figure 6.
Time Efficiency Nbr links Creations Deletions Errors Pairwise
stability
0000000
10 15,05 9 9 0 0 0
20 34,09 15 15 0 0 0
30 84,59 21 21 0 1 0
40 115,35 25 25 0 2 0
50 136,94 31 31 0 2 0
100 162,81 48 49 1 5 0
200 169,43 54 62 8 6 0
500 171,96 58 79 21 6 0
1000 173,13 57 84 27 6 0
2000 172,81 55 86 31 6 1
5000 172,81 55 86 31 6 1
10.000 173,31 56 91 35 7 1
Table 2. Some graph indexes of the network presented in Figure 6.
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